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Taylor: Taylor: Read the Fine Print

Read the Fine Print-Alabama
Supreme Court Rules that Binding
Arbitration Provisions in Written
Warranties are Okay
Southern Energy Homes, Inc. v. Ard 1

I. INTRODUCTION
When a consumer purchases an item that includes a warranty, they generally do
not read the warranty, and a consumer expects that they will have a right to a judicial
forum should the warranty come into play. However, courts have recently faced the
issue of whether or not binding arbitration provisions in written warranties preclude
the consumer from appearing in a courtroom. The Supreme Court of Alabama, in
Southern Energy Homes, Inc. v. Ard, held that inclusion of binding arbitration
provisions in written warranties is acceptable, despite the intent of the MagnusonMoss Act.'

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Michael and Marsha Ard ("Ards") purchased a home manufactured by Southern
Energy Homes, Inc. ("Southern Energy") through retailer Southland Quality Homes,
Inc. ("Southland Quality"). 3 The furnace caused the home to catch on fire and the
Ards then filed a civil action against both Southern Energy and Southland Quality
alleging various claims of manufacturing defects and breach of warranty. 4 Both
Southland Quality and Southern Energy moved the trial court to stay litigation and
compel arbitration.5 The trial court granted Southland Quality's motion to compel
arbitration but denied Southern Energy's motion.6 Southern Energy then appealed
to the Supreme Court of Alabama, which decided whether the Ards actually entered

1. 772 So. 2d 1131 (Ala. 2000).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301 -2312 (1994). See generally Annotation, Consumer Product Warranty Suits
in FederalCourt under Magnuson-Moss Warranty-FederalTrade Commission Improvement Act, 59

A.L.R. FED. 461,464 § 2[a](1982):
In response to the widespread misuse by merchants of express warranties and disclaimers,
Congress enacted the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement
Act of 1975. (citations omitted). This Act, which represents the first federal entry to the
law governingexpress and implied warranties and disclaimers, has had a substantial impact
upon the warranty provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code. In general, it mandates
certain guidelines in connection with written warranties and where written warranties are
given, it invalidates attempts to disclaim implied warranties.
3. Southern, 772 So. 2d at 1132-33.
4. Id. at 1132.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 1133.
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into a binding agreement to arbitrate with Southern Energy due to an arbitration
clause in the home warranty7 and, if so, whether the Magnuson-Moss Act"
invalidates the arbitration clause found in the written warranty. 9
The Ards offered two arguments concerning why they should not be forced into
arbitration. First, the Ards argued that Southern Energy's motion to compel
arbitration would be a violation of the Magnuson-Moss Act.' Second, the Ards
argued that they never made any express agreement to arbitrate with Southern
Energy." The Ards claimed they never signed or accepted any arbitration clauses
and that the arbitration clause in question was inconspicuous because neither the
table of contents nor the caption where the clause was found contained the word
"arbitration."' 2
Southern Energy responded by submitting two documents to the court. The first
document was entitled "Southern Energy Warranty-Limited One Year/Five Year
Warranty" which contained the arbitration clause found in the Home Owner's
Manual. 3 The second document was an affidavit stating that Michael Ard requested
and received warranty service from Southern Energy. 4 Southern Energy then
argued that these documents created a prima facie case for the existence of an
agreement to arbitrate.' 5
The trial court ruled in favor of the Ards stating that there was never any
specific agreement to arbitrate with Southern Energy.' 6 The trial court reasoned that
the situation was very similar to another Alabama case, in which Southern Energy
7. The specific clause in question was found in Southern Energy's Home Owner's Manual and
contained the following language:
IF THE PROBLEM IS STILL NOT RESOLVED:
If your problems are not satisfactorily remedied through the steps set out above, you are
entitled to have the dispute settled through binding arbitration as set out below:
In the event of any dispute or claim, arising out of or in connection with the design,
construction, warranty or repair of any product or component supplied by the
Manufacturer, the condition of the product, the conformity of the product, the
merchantability of the product, whether such product is or is not 'new,' any
representations, promises, undertakings or covenants made or allegedly made by the
Manufacturer in connection with or arising out of any transaction or undertaking between
the Manufacturer and any purchaser, or subsequent purchaser, the Manufacturer and the
purchaser of this product agree to submit such dispute or claim to binding arbitration,
pursuant to the provisions of 9 USC 1, et. seq. and according to the Commercial Rules of
Arbitration of the American Arbitration Association then existing.
Id.
8. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301- 2312.
9. Southern, 772 So. 2d at 1133-34.
at 1133.
10. Id.
at 1134.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 1135.
13. Id. at 1132.
14. Id. The affidavit from Don McNutt stated:
According to the books and records of Southern Energy Homes, Inc., the Ards requested
and received warranty service from Southern Energy pursuant to the terms of the warranty
issued by Southern Energy. At the time of service, Michael Ard signed a work order
certifying that the parts and work described on the order have been furnished and the
repairs had been made to his satisfaction.
Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.at 1134.
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was a defendant, that held an arbitration clause to be non-binding as between the
parties. 7
The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the trial court's decision."8 The court
stated that the Ards did accept the warranty provisions of the Home Owner's Manual
by receiving warranty service and in doing so they accepted the arbitration clause."j
The court reasoned that the Ards cannot accept some conditions of the contract with
Southern Energy and refuse to accept others explicitly listed.2" The court held that
when an arbitration provision is located in a written warranty clause, the MagnusonMoss Act does not invalidate the arbitration provision.2'

III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
In passing the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), Congress intended to give
arbitration agreements the same standing as other contracts. 22 The fundamental
purpose of the FAA is to make sure "that private arbitration agreements to arbitrate
are enforced according to their terms ... ,23 The FAA enforces arbitration
agreements as to "a written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract
evidencing a transaction involving commerce ....
The Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act
("Magnuson-Moss Act")25 was subsequently passed by Congress "[i]n order to

17. Id. (citing Ex parte Isbell, 708 So. 2d 571 (Ala. 1997)). In Ex parte Isbell, the Supreme Court of
Alabama held in part that a manufacturer, which was not a signatory to an installment contract, could
not rely on an arbitration clause found in the warranty contract. Id. at 581.
18. Southern, 772 So. 2d at 1134.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.at 1135.
22. See Rhode v. E & T Invs., Inc., 6 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1326 (M.D. Ala. 1998) ("The [FAA'sl
purpose 'was to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements that... had been
adopted by American courts, and to place arbitration agreements upon the same footing as other
contracts."' (quoting Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 25 (1991 ))).
23. Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 409
(1989).
24. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994):
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such
contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an
agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of'such a
contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and entbrceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
Section three of the FAA states:
If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States upon any
issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such arbitration, the court
in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue involved in such suit or
proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an agreement, shall on application of one
of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance
with the terms of the agreement, providing the applicant for the stay is not in default in
proceeding with such arbitration.
Id.§ 3.

25. 15 U.S.C. § 2301.
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improve the adequacy of information available to consumers, [and] prevent
deception." 6 The Act further states that "a consumer who is damaged by the failure
of a supplier, warrantor, or service contractor to comply with an obligation under this
title or under a written warranty, implied warranty, or service contract, may bring
suit for damages and other legal and equitable relief. .. ,7 The Magnuson-Moss
Act also provides for the establishment of "informal dispute settlement
mechanisms[,]" 28and states that"[o]ne or more warrantors may establish an informal
2...',29
This procedure must comply with certain
dispute settlement procedure .
"minimum requirements" to be promulgated by the Federal Trade Commission. °
The Magnuson-Moss Act further provides that
if a warrantor "establishes such a procedure," and if the procedure meets the
Commission's rules, and if the warrantor "incorporates in a written warranty a
requirement that the consumer resort to such procedure before pursuing any
legal remedy, then... the consumer may not commence a civil action ... unless
he initially resorts to such procedure."'"
The conflicting nature of these statutes has caused courts interpretation
difficulties regarding whether the Magnuson-Moss Act prohibits the inclusion of
arbitration clauses in written warranties3 2 and therefore supersedes the FAA. This
issue has been the topic in several recent cases decided by the federal courts in
Alabama and the Supreme Court of Alabama. 3 In Southern Energy Homes, Inc. v.
Ard, the Alabama Supreme Court overturned one of its recent decisions and held that
the Magnuson-Moss Act does not supersede the FAA, and therefore, binding
arbitration agreements in written warranties are enforceable. 4
In the early cases in Alabama dealing with this statutory conflict, the state court
held that the Magnuson-Moss Act does indeed supersede the FAA. The court turned
to the legislative history of the Magnuson-Moss Act to override the FAA and hold
binding arbitration clauses in warranties invalid. The court pointed to the remarks
made by Congressman Moss, one of the bill's sponsors:

26. 15 U.S.C. § 2302(a). The Magnuson-Moss Act sets out clear and comprehensive requirements
regarding disclosures, duties, and remedies associated with warranties on consumer products. Southern,
772 So. 2d at 1139. It covers "tangible personal property which is distributed in commerce and which
is normally used for personal, family or household purposes." hi. (quoting Wilson v. Waverlee Homes,
Inc., 954 F. Supp. 1530, 1537 (M.D. Ala. 1997)).
27. 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d).
28. Id. § 2310(a)(1).
29. Id. § 2310(a)(3).
30. See id. § 2310(a)(2).
31. Wilson, 954 F. Supp. at 1537 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
32. See Boyd v. Homes of Legend, Inc., 981 F. Supp. 1423 (M.D. Ala. 1997). in this case, the court
stated that the Magnuson-Moss Act "is exclusively in the context of written warranties, and then solely
with respect to informal mechanisms of dispute resolution prescribed in § 2310(a) of the Act, that
Congress sought to limit recourse to binding arbitration." li. at 1438.
33. See, e.g., Wilson, 954 F. Supp. 1530: Bovd, 981 F. Supp. 1423; Southern, 772 So. 2d 1131;
Southern Energy Homes, Inc. v. Lee, 732 So. 2d 994 (Ala. 1999); Ex parte Isbell, 708 So. 2d 571.
34. See generally Southern, 772 So. 2d 1131 (overturning Southern v. Lee, 732 So. 2d 994).
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First, the bill provides the consumer with an economically feasible private
right of action so that when a warrantor breaches his warranty or service
contract obligations, the consumer can have effective redress.
Reasonable attorney's fees and expenses are provided for the successful
consumer litigant, and the bill is further refined so as to place a minimum
extra burden on the courts by requiring as a prerequisite to suit that the
purchaser give the [warrantor] reasonable opportunity to settle the dispute
out of court, including the use of a fair and formal dispute settlement
mechanism.35
The court also referred to a House report that stated that "[a]n adverse decision
in any informal dispute settlement proceeding would not be a bar to a civil action on
the warranty involved in the proceeding .... ,36 In addition, the court looked to the
remarks made by the Federal Trade Commission to reach its decision that the
Magnuson-Moss Act supersedes the FAA.37
Recently, the Alabama Supreme Court overturned its 1999 ruling that the
Magnuson-Moss Act superseded the FAA and used a three-part approach set out in
Shearson/AmericanExpress, Inc. v. McMahon for determining congressional intent
to prohibit arbitration.3" Using this three-part approach, the party opposing
compelled arbitration under the FAA can use a statute's text, legislative history, or
an inherent conflict between arbitration and the statute's underlying purpose to
demonstrate that a court should not compel arbitration under the FAA.3 9 If the party
opposing arbitration could prove to the court that Congress intended the MagnusonMoss Act to override the FAA by using this approach, then that party would
prevail.4
In looking at text, legislative history, and whether or not there is a conflict
between federal statutory purposes, the Supreme Court has "abandoned the view that
arbitration is an inadequate forum and has consistently upheld the application of the
FAA to claims arising under federal statutes." 4' Thus, the Supreme Court has held

35. Wilson, 954 F. Supp. at 1538 (quoting 119 CONG. REc. 972 (Jan. 12, 1973)).
36. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 93-1107 (1978), reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7702, 7723).
37. Id.
Several industry representatives contended that warrantors should be allowed to require
consumers to resort to mechanisms whose decisions would be legally binding (e.g., binding
arbitration). The Rule does not allow for this for two reasons. First,. . . Congressional
intent was that Section 110 Mechanisms not be legally binding. Second, even if binding
Mechanisms were contemplated by Section 110 of the Act, the Commission is not
prepared, at this point in time, to develop guidelines for a system in which consumers
would commit themselves, at the time of product purchase, to resolve any difficulties in
a binding, but non-judicial, proceeding. The Commission is not now convinced that any
guidelines which it set out could ensure sufficient protection for consumers against
warrantors, even if the Congressional report had not made clear, as it did, that it wished for
such mechanisms to not be binding.
40 Fed. Reg. 60168,60210 (1975). The Commission has further stated that "reference within the written
warranty to any binding, non-judicial remedy is prohibited by the Rule and the Act." Id. at 60211.
38. See Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 227 (1987).
39. Id. at 226-27.
40. Id. at 227 ("The burden is on the party opposing arbitration, however, to show that Congress
intended to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue.").
41. Southern v. Lee, 732 So. 2d at 1006 (See, J., dissenting).
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that arbitration clauses are enforceable under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,42
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 43 and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 44 using the three-part approach. In each case,
the Supreme Court noted that nowhere in the statutes' text or in the legislative
histories was arbitration expressly precluded.45 The Supreme Court then looked to
see if it could find a conflict between the underlying purpose of the statutes and the
FAA.46 The Supreme Court could not find any irreconcilable conflicts between the
statutes and the FAA.47 Because the opposing party in each of these cases could not
establish that Congress intended for a judicial forum to override arbitration clauses,
the statutes did not preclude binding arbitration.

IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Southern Energy v. Ard, the Supreme Court of Alabama faced the question
of whether an arbitration agreement in a manufacturer's express warranty clause is
enforceable under the Magnuson-Moss Act.48 The court rejected the trial court's
decision that the arbitration agreement was unenforceable due to the MagnusonMoss Act and in doing so overruled its recent decision that the Magnuson-Moss Act
supersedes the FAA.49
In determining that the arbitration agreement in the express warranty was
enforceable against the Ards, the court used the Shearson/AmericanExpress threepart approach 0 to determine that the Magnuson-Moss Act does not preclude binding
arbitration under the FAA." The court noted that nowhere in the text of the
Magnuson-Moss Act does it expressly preclude arbitration.52 The court did not find
that the provision in the Magnuson-Moss Act for the use of a non-binding dispute
resolution procedure as a prerequisite for pursuing a written warranty claim in court
implies a statutory prohibition of binding arbitration of those claims.5 3 The court
then noted that the legislative history of the Magnuson-Moss Act does not express
a clear intent to preclude enforcement of the FAA. 4 The court again compared the

42. See Shearson/American Express, 482 U.S. at 238 (declining to read § 29(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 to prohibit enforcement of predispute agreements to arbitrate).
43. Id. ("[T]here is nothing in the text of the RICO statute that even arguably evinces congressional
intent to exclude civil RICO claims from the dictates of the Arbitration Act.").
44. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26-27 (disagreeing that compulsory arbitration of ADEA claims pursuant
to arbitration agreements would be inconsistent with the statutory framework and purposes of the
ADEA).
45. Southern v. Lee, 732 So. 2d at 1007-08 (See, J., dissenting).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Southern, 772 So. 2d at 1132.
49. Id. at It34.
50. See supra text accompanying note 38.
51. Southern, 772 So. 2d at 1134-35.
52. Southern v. Lee, 732 So. 2d at 1008 (Justice See's dissent is the basis for the ruling in Southern

v.Ard).

53. Id. (pointing out that the ADEA has a similar provision and the Supreme Court has held that
claims under the ADEA are subject to arbitration). See generally Gilmer, 500 U.S. 20.
54. Southern v. Lee, 732 So. 2d at 1008.
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Southern Energy v. Ard case to a Supreme Court case55 that held that the legislative
history of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 does not preclude binding arbitration
agreements under the FAA.56 The court stated that the "legislative history of the
Magnuson-Moss Act does not demonstrate an intent 'to limit or prohibit waiver of
a judicial forum."' The court also noted that there is no irreconcilable conflict
between arbitration and the purposes of the Magnuson-Moss Act.5 8 The court
pointed to the purposes of the Magnuson-Moss Act59 and again compared the instant
case to the Supreme Court case involving the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 as
proof of no irreconcilable conflicts. 60 The court also discussed the Federal Trade
Commission's comments on the Magnuson-Moss Act and arbitration agreements but
found the comments unpersuasive because the Supreme Court ruled, after the
were made, that arbitration agreements under certain federal statutes are
comments
61
binding.
The Alabama Supreme Court further noted that the Ards were contractually
bound to the arbitration agreement because they accepted the benefits of the
warranty containing the arbitration agreement as shown by the affidavit Southern
Energy submitted.62 The court made the proposition that a party cannot
simultaneously claim the benefits of a contract and repudiate its burdens and
conditions.63
The dissent argued that the court should not overrule its previous decision in
Southern Energy Homes, Inc. v. Lee.64 The dissent based its argument on the
legislative history of the Magnuson-Moss Act, the wording of the Magnuson-Moss

55. Shearson/American Express, 482 U.S. 220.
56. Southern v. Lee, 732 So. 2d at 1009 (See, J., dissenting).
Despite the express language indicating a congressional approval of Wilko 's holding
against arbitration, the Supreme Court held that Congress did not intend to bar enforcement
of all predispute arbitration agreements. Given the Supreme Court's pro-arbitration
interpretation of the Conference Report to the Securities Exchange Act, which expressly
deals with arbitration, I cannot accept the district court's anti-arbitration interpretation of
the House Report to the Magnuson-Moss Act, which does not expressly deal with
arbitration.
Id.
57. Id. (quoting Shearson/American Express, 482 U.S. at 227).
58. Id.
59. See supra text accompanying note 35.
60. Southern v. Lee, 732 So. 2d at 1010 (See, J., dissenting).
Further, in McMahon . . . , the Supreme Court expressly rejected the 'inequality of
bargaining power' argument as a means of creating an irreconcilable conflict between the
Securities Exchange Act and the FAA, holding that assertions of unequal bargaining power
should be addressed in the context of the particular facts of each individual case. Thus,
there is no irreconcilable conflict between binding arbitration and the purposes of the
Magnuson-Moss Act.
Id.
61. Id. at 1010 ("Although reasonable deference is due an interpretation of a statute by an agency
charged with administering that statute, no such deference is due when the Supreme Court has expressly
rejected the rationale on which the agency interpretation is based.").
62. Southern, 772 So. 2d at 1132.
63. See Value Auto Credit, Inc. v. Talley, 727 So. 2d 61 (Ala. 1999). See also Infiniti of Mobile, Inc.
v. Office, 727 So. 2d 42 (Ala. 1999).
64. Southern, 772 So. 2d at 1135 (Johnstone, J., dissenting).
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Act, 65 and the comments provided by the Federal Trade Commission that "it was
Congress's intent that any non-judicial dispute resolution procedures would be non' 66
binding, and consumers would always retain the right of final access to court.

V. COMMENT
In Southern Energy v. Ard, the Alabama Supreme Court overturned its previous
decision, just over a year old,67 and accepted the argument that the Magnuson-Moss
Act does not forbid the use of binding arbitration clauses in written warranties and
therefore does not overrule the Federal Arbitration Act. 6 In overturning its own
precedent, the court followed the precedent of the Supreme Court in upholding the
application of the FAA to claims arising under federal statutes.69
The court faced the competing policies of whether to allow binding arbitration
or to allow consumers a judicial forum. The court chose to follow the Supreme
Court rulings on other federal statutes and gave them more weight than the
seemingly anti-binding arbitration, legislative history of the Magnuson-Moss Act,
the Federal Trade Commission's comments, and the court's own precedent. In
following the Supreme Court rulings on other federal statutes, the court used the
three-prong test set out in Shearson/American Express7" and gave the MagnusonMoss Act a very narrow interpretation.
Under the textual prong of the Shearson/AmericanExpress test, it is true that the
Magnuson-Moss Act never expressly precludes arbitration.7 However, it is also true
that the Magnuson-Moss Act gave the Federal Trade Commission the power to
interpret the Act and that the Federal Trade Commission has explicitly stated that the
Act does not allow for binding arbitration.72 Faced with these competing ideas, why
did the court in this case choose not to follow the agency that was charged with
interpreting the Act? One possible reason could be that the state court did not want

65. 16 C.F.R. § 703.5(3)(g)(1 ) ("The Mechanism shall inform the consumer, at the time of disclosure
required in paragraph (d) of this section that: (1)If he or she is dissatisfied with its decision or
warrantor's intended actions ... legal remedies, including use of small claims court, may be pursued.").
66. Southern, 772 So. 2d at 1139 (quoting Justice Johnstone's dissent).
Several industry representatives contended that warrantors should be allowed to require
consumers to resort to mechanisms whose decisions would be legally binding (e.g., binding
arbitration). The Rule does not allow for this for two reasons. First,... Congressional
intent was that Section 110 Mechanisms not be legally binding. Second, even if binding
Mechanisms were contemplated by Section 110 of the Act, the Commission is not
prepared, at this point in time, to develop guidelines for a system in which consumers
would commit themselves, at the time of product purchase, to resolve any difficulties in
a binding, but nonjudicial, proceeding. The Commission is not now convinced that any
guidelines which it set out could ensure sufficient protection for consumers against
warrantors, even if the Congressional report had not made clear, as it did, that it wished for
such mechanisms to not be binding.
40 Fed. Reg. 60168, 60210.
67. See Southern v. Lee, 732 So. 2d 994.
68. Southern, 772 So. 2d at 1135.
69. See supra text accompanying notes 42-44.
70. See supra text accompanying note 38.
71. See supra text accompanying note 45.
72. See supra text accompanying note 66.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2001/iss1/12

8

20011

Taylor: Taylor: Read the Fine Print
Read the Fine Print

to shun the federal court's policy favoring arbitration as evidenced by the line of
Supreme Court cases dealing with federal statutes. 3 However, this reasoning
provides little support for the court's ruling. There is one crucial difference between
the federal statutes that the Supreme Court has ruled on and the Magnuson-Moss
Act: the Magnuson-Moss Act has a provision dealing specifically with alternative
dispute resolution that permits such procedures if they are non-binding. 7' The actual
text of the Magnuson-Moss Act does not expressly repudiate binding arbitration, but
the Federal Trade Commission's interpretation of the Act, along with the specific
provisions of the Act dealing with arbitration, leads one to believe that the court
should have placed more faith in its own precedent.
Under the legislative history prong, the court in Southern Energy v. Ard felt that
the Magnuson-Moss Act did not express a clear intent to preclude enforcement of
the FAA.7' The court turned to a prior Supreme Court case ruling on another federal
statute to back its holding. 6 Once again, the court seemed to bypass the legislative
history of the Magnuson-Moss Act and tried to compare the history of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, and a Supreme Court ruling on that Act, to the case at hand.77
By doing so, the court ignored all of its own precedent that dealt with the same
specific facts and looked instead to extrinsic cases that dealt with different statutes
and different facts. Other courts facing these same issues have all looked to the
legislative history of the Magnuson-Moss Act, comments made by the sponsors of
the bill, and the comments made by the Federal Trade Commission and have all
reached the same conclusion that the Magnuson-Moss Act does not allow for binding
arbitration. 71 Why then does the court feel that it should ignore all of these findings
and overturn its own ruling? Again, the court feels that it is following the favorable
federal policy towards arbitration by allowing for binding arbitration in written
warranties. The court might have also felt that if Congress had wanted to correct this
problem it could have amended the Magnuson-Moss Act to expressly repudiate
binding arbitration agreements. However, guidance from the agency charged with
interpreting the Magnuson-Moss Act, the Federal Trade Commission, makes this
reasoning appear weak and flawed, especially in light of the agency's recent
reaffirmation of its interpretation of the Magnuson-Moss Act.7 9

73. See supra text accompanying notes 42-44.
74. See supra text accompanying notes 28-31.
75. See supra text accompanying note 54.
76. See supra text accompanying note 55.
77. Southern v. Lee, 732 So. 2d at 1009 (See, J., dissenting).
78. SeeBoyd, 981 F. Supp. 1423; Wilson, 954 F. Supp. 1530; Philyaw v. Platinum Enters., Inc., 2001
WL 112107 (Va. Jan. 9, 2001); Yeomans v. Homes of Legend, Inc., 2001 WL 237313 (M.D. Ala. Mar.
5,2001).
79. Final Action Concerning Review of Interpretations of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 64 Fed.
Reg. 19700, 19708-09 (Apr. 22, 1999):
[In 19751 the Commission determined that "reference within the written warranty to any
binding, non-judicial remedy is prohibited by the Rule and the Act." The Commission
believes that this interpretation continues to be correct. Therefore, the Commission has
determined not to amend [its Rule] to allow for binding arbitration. [The Rule] will
continue to prohibit warrantors from including binding arbitration clauses in their contracts
with consumers that would require consumers to submit warranty disputes to binding
arbitration.
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Under the irreconcilable conflicts prong of the test, the court again used a
reference to the Supreme Court case dealing with arbitration under the Securities Act
of 1934 to conclude that there are no irreconcilable differences between arbitration
and the purposes of the Magnuson-Moss Act. 0 The court once more bypassed all
legislative history dealing directly with the Magnuson-Moss Act and instead relied
on holdings issued by the Supreme Court dealing with unrelated federal statutes. In
its ruling, the court stated that "[t]he FTC's statements against arbitrating MagnusonMcMahon..., and Gilmer."'" This
Moss Act claims predate MitsubishiMotors....
implies that the Supreme Court would more than likely rule in favor of binding
arbitration clauses in written warranties. However, this statement no longer holds
weight due to the recent comments made by the Federal Trade Commission. 2 The
Southern Energy v. Ard court should have taken notice of the recent comments made
by the Federal Trade Commission because they were made after the decision in
Southern Energy Homes, Inc. v. Lee. The court should have also taken heed of the
fact that the Magnuson-Moss Act provides for consumer recovery of attorneys' fees
and reasonable costs in the context of a court proceeding, but not in the context of
arbitration. 3 Allowing for binding arbitration provisions, in effect, takes the
incentive away from the consumer who cannot afford to bring a meritorious claim
because they will not be allowed to recover any expenses.8 " This in turn gives the
warrantor added incentive to put in a binding arbitration provision knowing that the
chances of a consumer bringing a claim are less likely. The court's ruling-allowing
binding arbitration, and therefore not allowing for recovery of expenses-presents
an irreconcilable conflict between arbitration and the provisions allowing for
recovery of expenses in the Magnuson-Moss Act.
Consumers generally do not have equal bargaining power in relation to
warrantors. When consumers purchase products, they do not generally bargain for
such things as arbitration provisions, or for that matter, warranty provisions.
Consumers usually buy things off the shelf or off the lot without fully looking
through the user's manual or warranty contract that comes along with the purchased
good. Therefore, warrantors can put in binding arbitration provisions without the
consumer even bargaining for it. This puts the warrantor into a superior position
should the warranty and arbitration provision come into play; it forces the consumer
out of court and likely lowers the expected payout by the warrantor 5 or lowers the

80. Southern v. Lee, 732 So. 2d at 1009 (See, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 1012 (See, J., dissenting) (discussing the Supreme Court cases dealing with other federal
statutes).
82. Southern v. Lee, 732 So. 2d at 1009 (See, J., dissenting).
83. See 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(2) (allowing for recovery of costs and attorneys' fees).
84. See Mace E. Gunter, Can Warrantors Make an End Run? The Magnuson-Moss Act and
Mandatory Arbitration in Written Warranties, 34 GA. L. REv. 1483, 1511 (2000) ("The American
Arbitration Association, responding to criticism of binding arbitration agreements in the consumer
context, established an advisory committee in 1997 which acknowledged the problems of forced
arbitration in the consumer context, including the cost barriers and the lack of remedies provided in
arbitration-including attorneys' fees.").
85. See David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and Consumer
Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 Wis. L. REv. 33, 65 (noting that one study
found median verdict from jury is $264,700 and mean verdict from jury is $703,600, while arbitration
garners median award of $49,400 and mean award of $124,500).
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probability that a claim will be brought at all if a consumer is forced to pay large
expenses in order to be able to arbitrate.86 This goes against public policy that
consumers should have an accessible judicial forum in which to dispute their claims.
The text of the Magnuson-Moss Act, the legislative history of the Act, the statements
of the Federal Trade Commission, and the comments made by the sponsors of the
bill all point in the direction that the Magnuson-Moss Act intended that any nonjudicial dispute resolution procedures would be nonbinding and that consumers
would always retain the right of final access to court. This has been the view
accepted by most other courts facing the same problem. 7 The court's narrow
interpretation of the Magnuson-Moss Act would force all consumers who purchase
goods in interstate commerce, with binding arbitration provisions included
somewhere in the warranty, to forego any judicial forum and only allow binding
arbitration, even if the parties did not expressly agree to the arbitration provision.
The court's strict interpretation goes against the policy of allowing consumers access
to court and will not allow the consumer to recover the expenses of attorneys' fees
and costs, which the text of the Magnuson-Moss Act expressly allows."8

VI. CONCLUSION
The holding of the Alabama Supreme Court has not had much effect on
subsequent rulings about whether the Magnuson-Moss Act supersedes the FAA.
Other courts dealing with the same issue have held that binding arbitration
provisions located in written warranties are unenforceable and conflict with the
Magnuson-Moss Act. 9 It will be interesting to see how the Alabama Supreme Court
will rule on this issue in future cases knowing that other jurisdictions have
consistently held the opposite of Southern Energy v. Ard. It will also be interesting
to see if the United States Supreme Court will grant certiorari for one of these cases
to settle the dispute once and for all. As it stands, the rule set forth by the Alabama
Supreme Court goes against the majority view, both federal and state. The court
should have followed its own precedent, supported by legislative history, and held

86. See Jean R. Stemlight, Gateway Widens Door to Imposing Unfair Binding Arbitration on
Consumers, 71 FLA. B.J. 8, 12 n.2 (1997) (noting that administrative fees of $2,000 are charged if
arbitration services of Intemational Chamber of Commerce are used). In light ofthe administrative fees,
a consumer will probably not bring a $500 claim to arbitration.
87. See Raesly v. Grand Housing, Inc., 105 F. Supp. 2d 562 (S.D. Miss. 2000) ("The court, in light
of the cited authorities, will deny at this time defendant's motion to compel arbitration as it relates to
their claim for breach of an express written warranty."). See also In re Van Blarcum, 19 S.W.3d 484
(Tex. Ct. App. 2000), on appealto Texas Supreme Court ("Because the Agreement compels arbitration
of the Van Barcums' written warranty claims in violation of the Act, we hold the Agreement is invalid
and unenforceable in its entirety .... ).
88. See 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(2) (providing provision for recovery of attorneys' fees and costs for
prevailing plaintiff).
89. See cases cited supra note 78.
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that binding arbitration provisions in written warranties are unenforceable due to the
Magnuson-Moss Act. 9°
GARRETr S. TAYLOR

90. The court's overturning of its recent decision might have been the result of the different makeup
of the Alabama Supreme Court. From the time the Southern Energy Homes. Inc. v. Lee case was handed
down, to the time the Southern Energy Homes, Inc. v. Ard case was handed down, three different
supreme court justices were ruling on the latter case. In both cases, five judges concurred and four
dissented.
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